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The world as a graph: defending metaphysical
graphical structuralism
NICHOLAS SHACKEL
Metaphysical graphical structuralism is the view that at some fundamental
level the world is a mathematical graph of nodes and edges. Randall Dipert
has advanced a graphical structuralist theory of fundamental particulars and
Alexander Bird has advanced a graphical structuralist theory of fundamental
properties. David Oderberg has posed a powerful challenge to graphical
structuralism: that it entails the absurd inexistence of the world or the
absurd cessation of all change. In this article, I defend graphical structural-
ism. A sharper formulation, some theorems about such structures, and care-
ful attention to the interaction of metaphysical and mathematical features,
shows that the absurdities depend on assumptions that are not essential to the
view and brings to light a surprising fact about the necessary structure of
fundamental properties.
Dipert (1997) proposes that ‘the concrete world is a single, large structure
induced by a single, two place, symmetric relation. . . [which is] best analyzed
as a certain sort of graph’ (1997: 329), namely a graph of nodes and edges,
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where nodes are the relata of the fundamental relation and edges link
nodes that stand in that relation. This is a monism because the nodes and
edges have no distinctness on their own, but rather, have identity only
through their location in the world structure and this amounts to their
identity depending on the entire world. Hence the proper parts of the
world, which are all the proper subgraphs of the world, have no independent
identity, whence, strictly speaking, there is just one thing that is – the whole
world.
In his original paper, Dipert vacillates between taking the graph as a de-
scription of the world and taking the graph to be the world. This introduces
some unnecessary obscurities. For example, in the quotation just given the
world is supposed to be both a single large structure and yet also metaphys-
ically induced by a relation, but if the latter then it is induced on some things
metaphysically prior to it by an equally metaphysically prior relation. This is
not strictly compatible with the monism that he clearly intends, since the
plurality of things and relation is metaphysically prior to the world whereas
monism requires it to be the other way around. The vacillation also causes
some unnecessary obstacles in defending a structural criterion of identity for
nodes.
These difficulties can be dispensed with by formulating the structuralist
position strictly in terms of the identity of graph and world. The world
is a complex unity whose parts are metaphysically dependent on the whole
and whose finest level of dependent entities are nodes and edges; hence
the world is a graph, whose structure gives rise to an internal two-
place symmetric relation that stands between any pair of nodes linked by
an edge.1
David Oderberg’s (2011: 6–9) challenge to particularist graphical structur-
alism runs, in brief:
(1) Suppose the world is a graph.
(2) If it is a graph it is an asymmetric graph.
(3) Any asymmetric graph can be turned into symmetric graph by the
removal of edges.
(4) The loss of less than all the edges of the world (specifically, the loss of
all those not part of some symmetric subgraph, a loss consequent on
certain nodes going out of existence) metaphysically entails the
non-existence of the entire world. (1, 2, 3)
(5) Therefore, the world is not a graph. (1, 4 reductio ad absurdum)
The second premiss is a consequence of the world being a graph in which
the nodes of the world have identity. Because Dipert is defending a monism
1 I shall ignore infinite graphs which introduce complications without adding anything es-
sential to our discussion.
metaphysical graphical structuralism | 11
 at O
xford University on January 25, 2011
a
n
alysis.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
he wants a purely structuralist criterion of identity: ‘entities are individuated
. . . solely by their graph-theoretic structural features’ (1997: 329).2
The fourth line can be resisted. It doesn’t immediately follow that, for some
symmetric subgraph of the world, if we removed edges that distinguish the
asymmetric graph from that subgraph, the entire world goes out of existence.
What the structuralist’s criterion of identity entails is that nodes which were
previously distinct would become identical, in a way determined by the sym-
metry of the symmetric subgraph. I think the manner is clear enough if I say
that the world would collapse to the ‘nearest’ asymmetrical graph – by which
I mean the asymmetrical graph you get from the symmetrical subgraph after
identifying nodes with the same kind of location.
Now of course, this is uncomfortable for the structuralist, indeed a mass of
further peculiarities might emerge depending on the precise nature of the
original graph. Changes would be abrupt, contradicting principles of con-
tinuity, and peculiarly arbitrary, in the sense that distinct entities originally
far apart3 might suddenly become one. The graph might become discon-
nected, so one world might shatter into many. If the order of the symmetry
group is greater than two then there may be more than one nearest asym-
metrical graph, depending on how distance is to be measured,4 leaving it
indeterminate which asymmetric graph supersedes.5
All of this is, I think, grist to Oderberg’s mill, and yet still not as devastat-
ing for the structuralist as the claimed implication of going out of existence.
The argument to inexistence might be saved given further argument showing
that agreed metaphysical principles entail certain additional graph theoretical
properties to be necessary for the world graph, since any such properties are
likely to be disrupted by collapses, and might not be preserved, thereby en-
tailing inexistence rather than collapse to a smaller world. This, however,
would take more detailed argumentation.
So the route to inexistence can be blocked. Removal of edges may lead only
to the collapse to a smaller asymmetric graph due to the merging of previ-
ously distinct nodes. From this I think it is evident that the fourth line (and
hence Oderberg’s argument) is implicitly relying on the necessity of identity,
2 Let: the kind of a node be the number of edges incident to it; an adjacency property of a
node be a property of the form ‘being a node of kind k adjacent to a node of kind m
which is adjacent to a node of kind n. . . which is adjacent to a node of kind j ’; the kind of
location of a node be the complete set of adjacency properties of that node; let a node be
graphically unique iff there is no other node in the graph that has the same kind of
location. Then graphical uniqueness is a necessary and sufficient criterion of identity.
Premiss 2 follows quickly from all nodes being graphically unique.
3 Distance between two nodes¼ shortest path linking them.
4 A definition of distance may be available from features of the symmetry group of the
symmetric graph, or perhaps from its quotient groups.
5 This last might, I suppose, be considered a kind of metaphysical explanation for how there
could be ontic randomness in the world.
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since that would rule out any such merging, leaving inexistence as the only
alternative.
Presupposing necessity of identity is not dialectically unreasonable.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that the structuralist must take the necessity of
identity as a constraint on his theory, most especially when we are speaking
of the identity of the dependent entities within a monist metaphysic. He might
rather think that whether identity is necessary or contingent should follow
from his structural criterion of identity.
I turn now to the question of absurdity in the fourth line. Oderberg thinks
Dipert faces a dilemma: ‘either . . . all or some individuals exist necessar-
ily . . . [or] the world can be destroyed by the removal of some individuals’
(2011: 6–7). He rejects the first horn since ‘surely all individuals in the phys-
ical world exist contingently’ hence only the absurdity of world destruction
remains.
It is worth noting for a start that Dipert is explicitly necessitarian:
There is one and only one asymmetric graph that . . . constitutes the
world and thus only one alethically ‘possible’ world or graph. (1997:
356 n. 45)
On this account it’s impossible for the world graph to be other than it is and
hence any change at all entails non-existence. So here the fourth line is true
and yet there is no absurdity in the loss of even a single edge entailing
non-existence. The absurdity would have to be in the necessitarianism.
What about the contingency of physical individuals? A natural way to
understand Dipert’s ‘sketch of how structuralism could analyze. . . [the phys-
ical world]’ (1997:355) is to take it to be committed to four-dimensionalism
about time and space and perdurantism about persistence:
there are . . . regular connecting paths among a certain subset of objects
(subgraphs) that we conceive as mid-sized, phenomenal ‘physical ob-
jects,’ and that these paths have the structure we identify as space and
time. (Dipert 1997: 356 n. 45)
So a physical individual is a collection of subgraphs with certain similarities
and joined in a certain way, each of which subgraphs is a temporal part of the
individual. I think it is clear that this allows physical individuals to come into
and go out of existence and hence the necessity of the existence of the nodes
does not entail the necessity of physical individuals. Thus Dipert’s necessi-
tarianism is compatible with individuals of the physical world being
contingent.6
6 I deal below with contingent in the sense of might never have existed.
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What about the fundamental physical individuals of physics? Here I think
that Oderberg’s central remark is potentially misleading:
So, in the physical case, say Dipert’s model of wholly relational individ-
uals, were any to go out of existence so would their relations to the
remaining individuals to which they were previously related. (2011: 6)
The plausibility of taking the nodes of the world graph to be contingent, and
hence capable of going out of existence, comes from taking the nodes of the
world graph to be the fundamental physical individuals of physics, a plausi-
bility which Oderberg has set up by earlier calling them ‘qualitatively
identical micro-particles’ (2011: 5). But Dipert explicitly rejects this when
he says:
Physical objects, even the finest subatomic particles, certainly do not
correspond to vertices. Instead, they themselves are composite entities,
subgraphs of the world graph. Physical microstructure is graph-
theoretic macrostructure. (1997: 356)
In this metaphysic the nodes and edges of the world are necessary existents,
but only in the same sense that in a standard four-dimensionalism, temporal
parts are necessary existents. Yes, if the nodes and edges are physical indi-
viduals then some physical individuals are necessary. But the contingency of
what we usually call physical individuals, including the fundamental physical
individuals of physics, remains.
The apparent absurdity of the loss of some edges resulting in the inexis-
tence of the world depended on taking the nodes and edges to be contingent
individuals of familiar physical varieties. But in fact, the contingency of the
latter individuals is compatible with the necessity of nodes and edges and the
necessity of the latter defeats the absurdity of their loss resulting in
inexistence.
If there is an absurdity remaining it is in Dipert’s necessitarianism. Yet, we
can now see that the defeat of the absurdity does not depend on necessitar-
ianism. We can allow that there are many possible worlds, each an asym-
metric graph.7 Neither the actual world nor any possible world is up for
having some of its edges deleted at some point in time since the existence
of the nodes and edges of a world are metaphysically entailed by the existence
of the world. So it is impossible to get rid of the nodes and edges of a world
and the argument to the absurd inexistence is blocked.
Bird (2007) develops a dispositional essentialist theory of properties, in
which there is a fundamental level of properties, which properties are poten-
cies. The fundamental level is fundamental because it is the ‘non-redundant
basis of causal relations’ and includes the ‘minimal base on which all else
7 So now we have contingent individuals in the sense that they might never have existed.
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supervenes’ (2007: 14). From here on, we speak only of properties of the
fundamental level.
An objection to Bird’s theory is that if all properties are potencies they have
nothing intrinsic to fix their identity, only their stimulus and manifestation
conditions, which in turn are further potencies. Hence their identity depends
on their relation to other potencies, and this leads to a vicious regress or
circularity, leaving their identity indeterminate. Bird’s defence to this objec-
tion is that the potencies are the nodes of an asymmetric directed graph in
which the directed edges (arrows) join a potency to the potency that is its
manifestation condition.8 Identity is secured by the graphical uniqueness of
each node.
Oderberg’s challenge to property graphical structuralism ‘applies . . . to
Bird’s graph theoretical structure of pure potencies at the fundamental
level’. His first argument is that Bird cannot remain neutral between
Aristotelean immanence and Platonic transcendence for properties but is
committed to transcendence. The basis for this is that under Aristotelean
immanence ‘by destroying every instance of a universal I destroy the univer-
sal’ and hence by destroying ‘every instance of enough potencies so that the
remaining potencies constituted a symmetric graph’ (2011: 7) the world
would go out of existence.9
This argument does not succeed on Armstrong’s version of immanence:
We certainly should not demand that every universal should be instan-
tiated now . . .The principle of instantiation should be interpreted as
ranging over all time. (Armstrong 2008: 65)
Immanent properties exist provided there is some time at which they are
instantiated. That there is a time after which some of them are no longer
instantiated doesn’t amount to their inexistence. Bird’s dispositional essen-
tialism does not rule out ‘any time’ immanence of potencies.
There are two ways to understand Oderberg’s premiss of destroying the
instances to destroy the universal. He might mean that he destroys all in-
stances over all times so the universal never exists. This, however, is just a
covert way of contrasting possible worlds, not a way of specifying an event in
a world that leads to its inexistence. So he can only mean that at a certain
time he destroys all the instances and after that time the universal is no longer
8 For completeness, Bird takes it that we need a graph with two types of directed edges, one
for manifestation conditions and the other for stimulus conditions. If two types are needed
then asymmetry is even easier so confining ourselves to standard directed graphs, as we
shall do for brevity, doesn’t help Bird.
9 When Oderberg says ‘we’d better hope that there are not a mere six potencies, since the
loss of any one of them would destroy all the rest. . .’ (2011: 7) he has slipped up. This
would be true were Bird’s graph a simple graph rather than a directed graph, since there
are no asymmetric simple graphs with between 2 and 5 nodes. However, the smallest
potency graphs have 3 nodes (Lemma 2, see Appendix).
metaphysical graphical structuralism | 15
 at O
xford University on January 25, 2011
a
n
alysis.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
instantiated. But that doesn’t entail inexistence of the world under ‘any time’
immanence of potencies, since that doesn’t amount to destroying the univer-
sal. He needs the additional premiss that the only properties that exist are the
properties that are instantiated now, and it is hard to see how to motivate
that premiss except by taking presentism as a premiss.
At root, Oderberg is appealing to some kind of very general conservation
principle, something like that you can’t get absolutely nothing out of some-
thing. The absurdity is not simply in how few potencies lost suffice for
inexistence but rather, in there being anything at all that could occur in the
natural succession of worldly events that would result in the sudden and
complete inexistence of the world. Whilst this may ‘strike us as bizarre’
(2011: 7), I’m not sure that we know it to be absurd. Supposing that it is
impossible, the question is whether, under presentism, immanence and dis-
positional essentialism, there might be a natural succession of worldly events,
possibly immensely complex, which would result in just the right potencies
no longer being instantiated, leaving only a symmetric graph of potencies and
hence leading to the inexistence of the world. The answer to that question is
more likely to be yes if losing only one potency suffices for inexistence.
Nevertheless, it might depend on the actual graph of potencies.
Furthermore, impossibility of the world’s inexistence in that way might
rather be a constraint on possible potency graphs (and hence on possible
worlds) than a refutation of dispositional essentialism. Or perhaps its impos-
sibility means that it is impossible to destroy all the instances of the right
potencies. Against this, however, consider the situation where all but the last
instance of the last right potency, say a photon energy level dependent for its
instantiation on diffraction by the wing of a particular butterfly, have been
destroyed. It isn’t credible that that butterfly is now metaphysically impos-
sible to destroy. So Bird’s dispositional essentialism might well be incompat-
ible with the conjunction of immanence and presentism.
Oderberg then runs an argument against Bird’s potencies understood as
Platonic transcendent properties. The objection here is not that the loss of
potencies leads to inexistence, because being Platonic they cannot be lost.
Rather, it is that if a single potency was not instantiated at all, ‘no power
could manifest itself – and so the fundamental level would grind to a halt’, a
consequence of which would be ‘the entire universe’s grinding to a halt’10
(2011: 8).
What Oderberg means here by the fundamental level is unclear. On the one
hand, talk of it grinding to a halt implies that it is usually undergoing change.
That sounds like he means a fundamental level of particulars. On the other
hand, in the context, he ought to mean Bird’s fundamental level, but that is
incompatible with talk of it grinding to a halt, because it is the changeless
transcendent graph of potencies. I take it that the absurdity aimed at is that
10 Since everything supervenes on the fundamental level.
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all change will cease. Here is my reconstruction of what I take to be the
argument for that conclusion:11
(1) A potency essentially requires a manifestation condition.
(2) Under dispositional essentialism a manifestation condition is a potency.
(3) Suppose a single potency, P, was instantiated nowhere and consider all
those potencies, Q, for which it is the manifestation condition.
(4) Dependency of Manifestation: For each instantiation of each of those
potencies the potency instantiated, Qi, would not be able to manifest
its manifestation condition, P, just because P is unavailable due to
being nowhere instantiated.
(5) Regress: Furthermore, each potency, Qi, is in turn the manifestation
condition for yet further potencies, R, each of which will now, due to
Qi being unable to manifest P, be unable to manifest Qi.
(6) The regress continues and will eventually reach all potencies.12
(7) Hence no potency will be able to manifest.
(8) Change is, or is the result of, the manifestation by potencies of their
manifestation condition.
(9) Therefore, all change will cease.
Premisses 1, 2 and 8 are agreed and the supposition of premiss 3 seems
possible.
Line 4 looks vulnerable to the objection that the occurrence of the stimulus
condition ofQi could lead to Qi bringing about a new instantiation of P. For
example, suppose no squark is spinning and up squarks are disposed to spin
on bumping into down squarks.13 Why shouldn’t a bump bring about a new
instantiation of spinning? New instantiations of properties in this manner are
entirely normal.
Oderberg would say the problem is that ‘every time a stimulus is applied,
whatever produces its manifestation miraculously pops back into existence’,
or is guaranteed to pop back into existence, or is guaranteed to exist (2011:
8). What produces the manifestation is the stimulus potency of the potency
that manifests, and that never went out of existence. So Oderberg has to be
speaking not of the producer of the manifestation but its bearer.
11 Lines 3, 4, 5 and 6 are what I make of ‘The necessarily existing powers would all still be
relationally defined . . . but none of their tokens would be able to manifest themselves if all
of the tokens of a single power type ceased to exist. For the tokens whose type was
essentially related to this single power type would themselves not be able to manifest
themselves, nor would the tokens whose type was essentially related to this second type,
and so on.’ (2011: 8)
12 It can only terminate at potencies that lack incoming arrows.
13 So spinning is the manifestation condition of up-ness, whose stimulus condition is
down-ness.
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What Oderberg intends is that P is instantiated nowhere because only a
certain kind of particular can instantiate it and no particulars of that kind
exist. So the reason Qi cannot manifest in a new instantiation of P is because
no particulars that can instantiate P exist and it would require a miracle or an
arbitrary guarantee for them to appear. The problem with this is twofold.
First, quantum physics seems to be full of particles popping into existence.
Second, the necessitarian aspect of dispositional essentialism makes the
theory seem well equipped to underwrite a guarantee. Potencies necessitate
their manifestation conditions when stimulated and hence the existence of a
bearer is necessitated. This sounds surprising but consider this example.
Suppose the raised energy level, dE, instantiated by a particular electron
encounters its stimulus condition. The electron collapses to its lower energy
level and emits a previously non-existent photon having frequency ¼dE/h,
which last is the manifestation condition of dE. Now suppose just prior to
this event no photons exist because they have all been absorbed by electrons.
Oderberg’s defence of Line 4 requires the non-existence of all the other pho-
tons to block the photon emission, an emission which would have occurred if
just one other photon existed. This is not credible.
Line 5 seems to assume that for a potency, Ri, to manifest its manifestation
condition Qi requires that its manifestation condition Qi manifest its own
manifestation condition, P. But that assumption is false. For Ri, to manifest
its manifestation condition, Qi, requires only that Qi instantiate quiescently,
not that Qi also manifest.
There is an inclination to reject the possibility of quiescent instantiation
because some chains of potencies result in the manifestation of one power
requiring not simply the instantiation but also the manifestation of the power
that is its manifestation condition. For example, an electron (belonging to an
atom) has the power, D, to absorb photons, and D itself manifests by its
manifestation condition, dE, an increased energy level of the electron. A
photon has the power, C, to be absorbed, and C manifests itself by photon
absorption, that is to say, by its manifestation condition, D, not merely
instantiating, but in addition, manifesting itself in itsmanifestation condition,
dE. So here we had a chain where manifestation of C could not stop at the
instantiation of manifestation condition, D, but had to continue. However, it
is clear that the chain can stop at the instantiation of dE, at the increased
energy level, and so dE instantiates quiescently. So it seems perfectly possible
that one potency should instantiate quiescently and for it to manifest to
require stimulation by a different potency.
When Qi is the manifestation condition of Ri and Ri is the stimulus con-
dition of Qi, Ri both manifests Qi and stimulates Qi thereby requiring Qi to
manifest in turn. As we just saw, this can be true for some potencies but Line
5 needs it to be true for all potencies. If that were the case stimulus and
manifestation would have lost their distinction (since they, too, are identified
structurally). Alternatively, if quiescent instantiation of potencies is ruled out
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and instantiation is manifestation then the manifestation relation and the
stimulus relation are really one and the same relation regarded from different
ends of the arrow. That seems doubtful.14
Oderberg clearly thinks it obvious that the regress reaches all potencies,
giving it no more than ‘and so on’ in his argument. In so doing he has missed
a number of difficulties. Provided Line 5 is true then the regress will continue
backward to some extent. But what is the guarantee that, as Line 6 puts it,
the regress reaches all potencies, and does so irrespective of which potency is
uninstantiated? Investigating whether that is true is non-trivial. Although
there are potency graphs for which the regress will reach all potencies
(Theorem 1, see Appendix), there are also potency graphs for which the
regress will not reach all potencies (Theorem 2) and that the regress can
leave untouched a subgraph of the original potency graph that is itself a
potency graph (Theorem 3). In the last case at least, only some processes
of change would cease; others would remain and change itself would not
cease. However, if the potencies must each have only one manifestation con-
dition, a plausible constraint at the fundamental level, and if the potency
graphs must be connected, then a potency graph must be a ‘snowflake’
(Snowflake Lemma) and as a consequence of having that structure the regress
can reach all potencies provided it starts from the right node (Uniquely
Manifesting Potencies Regress Theorem).
So this argument is by no means conclusive. Both of the crucial lines,
Dependency of Manifestation and Regress, face serious difficulties. If those
difficulties are resolved, its success still depends on the actual graph of poten-
cies allowing the regress to reach all potencies. But even then, an obstacle
remains. To get rid of all instantiations of a potency requires removing an
entire class of entities of a fundamental natural kind. It is not clear that it is
absurd that there should be one such class whose removal results in the
cessation of all change. For example, in a simple universe with only the
electromagnetic and the nuclear forces of the standard model of particle
physics, removing all the bosons would be removing all the force carrying
particles. It does not seem so absurd that if you remove all the force carrying
particles all change would cease. But if it is not absurd then the argument
cannot be wielded as a reductio of Platonic dispositional essentialism.
In conclusion, then, Oderberg has posed a serious challenge to some meta-
physical theories committed to graphical structuralism. We have seen that
graphical structuralism for theories of particulars can be in danger of absurd
inexistence and that graphical structuralism for theories of properties faces
a similar danger, and a further danger of absurd cessation of change. To
meet his challenge has required a sharper formulation of graphical
14 Bird, at least, thinks they are distinct. See 2007: 145.
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structuralism and investigation of specific structural features corresponding
to relevant metaphysical principles. The defence has revealed some import-
ant constraints. Particularist graphical structuralism is committed to
four-dimensionalism and a finer level of structure than physics regards as
fundamental, possibly finer than physics can treat as fundamental – this last
being, perhaps, a defect. Property graphical structuralism is probably incom-
patible with the conjunction of immanence and presentism and requires the
possibility of quiescent instantiation of potencies – which last might, also, be
a defect. Finally, the Snowflake Lemma: that all finite uniquely manifestible
connected potency graphs are ‘snowflakes’, is a surprising and perhaps im-
portant fact about the necessary structure of the fundamental level of proper-
ties under dispositional essentialism.
Appendix
A potency graph is a graph whose structure could be that had by a graph
whose nodes are potencies and whose arrows link potencies to manifestation
conditions. A manifestible graph has at least one arrow leaving each node. A
uniquely manifestible graph has exactly one arrow leaving each node. A full
walk starts at a node and keeps following arrows so long as it is able to. A
manifestation regress from a potency regresses by iteratively tracing back
from each potency already reached to all the potencies for which it is a
Figure A1. Snowflake.
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manifestation condition. A converging tree is one for which any full walk
starting at any node ends at the same node, which is the final node of the tree.
A snowflake is a graph composed of a one-way polygon each of whose nodes
may also be the final node of a converging tree that shares no arrows with the
polygon.
Lemma 2: The smallest potency graphs have 3 nodes.
Theorem 1: For any k 3, there is a potency graph with k nodes such that
for some node, there is a manifestation regress from that node that reaches all
potencies.
Theorem 2: There is a connected potency graph such that there is no node
from which a manifestation regress reaches all potencies.
Theorem 3: There is a connected potency graph for which a manifestation
regress leaves a subgraph that is a potency graph untouched.
Snowflake Lemma: All finite uniquely manifestible connected potency
graphs are snowflakes.
Uniquely Manifesting Potencies Regress Theorem: For all uniquely mani-
festible connected potency graphs there is node from which a regress will
reach all potencies.
Proofs available from the author.
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